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Abstract  
 
We explore the heterogeneous effects together with the transmission channels of aid on tax 
revenues in 47 African countries over 1990-2011 using a panel smooth threshold regression 
model and two alternative tax datasets from IMF and ICTD. We find that aid enhances tax 
revenues with decreasing returns for a threshold of 6.3% and 23% of GNI for total taxes and 
non-resource taxes respectively. Aid effect varies across countries and over time, but, on 
average, is positive. Moreover, we evidence that aid conditions the impact of the level of 
development, trade, institutions and resource wealth on tax. 
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1 Introduction
Financing development remains a great challenge as witnessed at the UN Third Inter-
national Conference held in Addis Ababa on 13-16 July 2015 where were advocated the
use of all sources of nance - public, private, domestic and international - together with
the implementation of eective policies. The mobilization of these dierent sources
of nance raises the question of whether they are independent, or complements or
substitutes. Recently, the relation between aid and tax in developing countries has
particularly received a great attention. The question is of great importance as these
countries are highly reliant on foreign aid and short of domestic resources to support the
funding of pro poor spending. Sub-Sahara African countries are a very illustrative case,
being the most reliant on foreign aid (aid to gdp of 10.8% on average) and, with a tax
to GDP ratio of 16%, far to reach the 20% target as suggested by the United Nations to
achieve the Millennium Development Goals (UN, 2011). The issue is hence whether aid
discourages domestic resources mobilization in the recipient countries. It is obviously a
big challenge to give a clear-cut answer. Indeed, aid is directed to governments which
use it to nance expenditure which in turn can promote tax compliance and growth.
A big concern is how the recipient governments behave in presence of heavy reliance
on aid. If all the state policy outcomes depend on foreign assistance, the possibility to
be more responsive to donors than to the citizens is likely acute. This may weaken a
proper development of internal democratic institutions and leads to a low level of tax
compliance and revenues.
No consensus emerges from the existing empirical literature. Benedek et al. (2012)
and Gupta et al. (2003) show that aid harms tax eort. Ouattara (2006), Teera and
Hudson (2004) nd that aid has no eect on tax revenues while Clist and Morrissey
(2011), Clist (2014) and Carter (2013) nd some positive eects. Besides the debate on
data quality, three main arguments can explain this ambiguity. First, aid composition
matters. Aid loans may have positive eects as they are to be repaid unlike grants for
which negative eects are expected. But empirical results on aid composition are also
mixed (Gupta et al., 2003; Benedek et al., 2012; Clist and Morrissey, 2011; Clist, 2014).
Second, heterogeneities among countries play a critical role. In particular, countries
with sound policies and institutions tend to exhibit a positive link between aid and tax
revenues (Brun et al., 2011b,a). However, Yohou et al. (2016) show that it would be
misleading to not strongly account for the heterogeneities among countries even if they
share identical macroeconomic policies.
Third, some authors debate the econometric specication and emphasize that results
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are sensitive to samples (Moss et al., 2006; Moore et al., 2007; Carter, 2013; Clist,
2014; Alonso and Garcimartn, 2011). In fact, most of studies suggest that the aid-tax
relationship is nonlinear by introducing a square term of aid. In particular, the echoed
works of Benedek et al. (2012) and Gupta et al. (2003) as well as Clist and Morrissey
(2011) show a positive sign for the square terms of overall ODA and grants against
a negative sign for loans. In other words, overall aid and grants present increasing
returns meaning that their negative eects may be oset if their levels are sucient.
By contrast, the positive eect of loans will be oset if they are too important. In more
recent papers, Morrissey et al. (2014) and Clist (2014) nd exceptional large levels
of aid respectively at 69% and 65% of GDP beyond which the eect of aid becomes
negative.
This paper oers a unique but simple empirical threshold framework that addresses
thoroughly the issues of heterogeneities and the form of aid-tax relationship. It brings
three major innovations focusing on 47 African countries over the period 1990-2011.
First, drawing from the previous studies, we argue that the impact of aid on tax revenues
is not homogenous, but depends on the degree of aid reliance.
However, the assessment of the heterogeneous eects here diers signicantly from
that of existing studies. As noted above existing studies model nonlinearity by a square
term or sub samples. By doing so, they explicitly assume that the nonlinear impact of
aid is constant through the entire time span and homogenous between countries. This
is not helpful to catch for example some eects of a learning-by-doing process in aid
schemes management and the eciency of some particular policies implemented at a
certain point of time. We do believe that the impact of aid for the same country can
gradually improve, as the aid allocation and management improve. One important ex-
ample in recent years is the framework created by the mechanism of the HIPC initiative
which has enhanced to a certain extent the conditionality related to good governance
and has improved the targeting of areas to be primarily funded. Therefore, we rea-
sonably assume that aid eects are not constant over time and across countries. We
then depart from the existing literature by using a Panel Smooth Threshold Regression
(PSTR) approach to account for such time and individual heterogeneous aid eects.
Second the PSTR is also helpful to address the issue of the usually-evoked but less
explored mediating eect of aid through the other tax potential factors. As suggested
by Carter (2013) and Morrissey et al. (2014), aid has some potential indirect eects
through some variables, generally included in aid-tax equation, that are related to tax
bases and collection eciency (income per capita, institutions, imports etc.). This
idea is also supported by the aid eectiveness literature. This suggests that the single
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estimate of aid may hide some part of the real eect of aid on tax revenues.
Third, existing aid-tax studies test the relationship between aid and total tax rev-
enue not exclusive of resource revenues. This is an imperfect approximation since the
main question of aid-tax relationship is how aid modulates state-society relationships
represented by the state reliance on non-resource tax revenue. We then take advantage
of the two advanced and competing tax datasets from International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and International Center for Taxation and Development (ICTD). Instead of fo-
cus on the dispute about their superiority over each other, we rather hang on their
original denitions to highlight the theoretical relationship of interest. While IMF
dataset documents the total tax revenue, the dataset from ICTD conversely provides
data on total tax excluding resource revenue.
Our main nding is that aid has a country specic and time-varying eect depending
on the deviation from a certain threshold level of aid estimated at 6.3% and 23%
of GNI with IMF total tax revenue and ICTD non-resource revenues, respectively.
Beyond these thresholds, aid has a positive eect with diminishing returns for larger
aid. For the entire sample, it results in a positive eect. Considering ICTD non-resource
taxes, our results support the evidence that larger aid enhances the positive eects of
trade openness and of the level of development but hampers that of institutions while
worsening the resource curse. Conversely with IMF total tax revenues, larger aid lowers
the positive eect of the level of development while increases those of trade openness
and of the manufacture sector.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 reviews the aid-tax
literature. Section 3 describes data and methodology. Section 4 presents the results.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Related literature
The recent studies on aid-tax specically use a single relationship in which aid is one
of the tax determinants beside the degree of openness, the level of development, the
quality of institutions, the level of ination etc. The results are very controversial.
Gupta et al. (2003) and Benedek et al. (2012) nd that aid lowers tax revenue on the
one hand. On the other hand, grants are pervasive whereas loans are ecient because
they must be repaid. These ndings are strongly challenged by Clist and Morrissey
(2011), Clist (2014) and Morrissey et al. (2014) who provide no evidence of a negative
impact of neither aid nor grants. They question also the quality of tax data used by
the two former works and nd that their conclusion are driven by a break due to data
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compilation from multiple sources. By using dierent datasets including those of Gupta
et al. (2003) and Benedek et al. (2012), they conclude that results of Gupta et al. (2003)
and Benedek et al. (2012) are not robust. Using dataset of Mansour and Keen (2009),
Bhushan and Samy (2012) nd that aid does not signicantly impact tax in general
and in sub-Saharan Africa over the period 1972-2008.
One prior concern about the ability of foreign aid to promote tax performances tends
to emphasize on its potential harmful eects on the recipient institutions. Taxation is
the core of state building since it demands more accountability from state towards its
citizen. Foreign assistance can then reduce the dependence of recipient governments
on their own citizen (Knack, 2009). It results in an increase in the accountability
towards the funders rather than towards the citizen and a more probable social contract
deterioration. To the extent that institutions matter for tax collection, foreign aid then
hinders tax performances. Brautigam and Knack (2004) give econometric support that
aid damages the quality of governance and the tax collection while Knack (2009) shows
that aid reduces governments' incentives to develop ecient tax system. Azam et al.
(1999) provide theoretical evidence that aid discourages governments to adopt good
policies and to develop an ecient system of public revenue and expenditure in the
long run.
In spite of these detrimental eects, aid may also contribute to institutional building
and tax performances. The aid-disbursement conditionalities on good governance and
economic reforms and associated technical assistance in tax administration may be
successful. Tavares (2003) nds that aid decreases corruption. Brun et al. (2011b)
nd that IMF programs have a positive impact on the public revenue mobilization
through improvements of the technical administrations in charge of the denition and
implementation of the tax reforms.
However, it tends to be broadly established that these positive eects emerge when
the recipient governments adopt good practices and have clear development agendas
(Brautigam and Knack, 2004). In contrast of the previous studies, the ad hoc assump-
tion is implicitly made that the quality of institutions and policies of the recipient
countries are the main driver of aid eectiveness, the reverse causality being controlled
by an instrumental variable approach. Hence, Brun et al. (2011b) nd that IMF pro-
grams work better if the quality of domestic administration is good. Especially, they
argue that the programs are less eective in sub-Saharan Africa countries because of the
poor quality of their institutions. Gupta et al. (2003) exhibit that decline in revenues
completely osets the increase in grants in countries experiencing high levels of corrup-
tion. Benedek et al. (2012) come to similar results and show that poor institutional
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quality worsens the negative eect of aid on tax revenues. Focusing on WAEMU coun-
tries through a PSTR approach, Yohou et al. (2016) show that aid eciency requires a
minimum level of government stability.
The empirical literature is aware that the inconclusiveness on aid-tax relationship is
due to shortcomings in data quality on tax revenues and econometric specication. Even
if IMF, OECD and think thanks like ICTD regularly update and correct existing data,
primary data quality remains a challenge given low domestic institutional development.
Various improvements of the econometric specication have been suggested. Carter
(2013) points that empirical studies should markedly control for the endogeneity of aid
and heterogeneities both in aid eects and in countries' tax structures. Some previous
studies deal with some of these concerns. Benedek et al. (2012) decompose total tax
revenues in various components: value added tax (VAT), excise and income tax and
trade tax. This does not change their main conclusion that aid has harmful eects on
taxation except the positive impact on trade taxes. The results of Morrissey et al. (2014)
are based on the non resource tax revenues while Bhushan and Samy (2012) also use
the tax to GDP ratio excluding both trade and resource taxes. Control for endogeneity
has been done in many ways with contrasting results. Brun et al. (2011a) and Brun
et al. (2011b) use an instrument based on Tavares (2003), and nd a positive eect,
while Benedek et al. (2012) concludes to a negative eect out of a GMM estimation.
Using the initial income and population and lagged values of aid as instruments in
2SLS estimations also produces a negative eect in Gupta et al. (2003) and Brautigam
and Knack (2004) while Bhushan and Samy (2012) do not nd any statistically eect.
The issue of endogeneity remains quite unsolved as this is the case in the broader aid
eectiveness literature, as detailed in Guillaumont and Wagner (2014).
Regarding heterogeneities, countries present diverse experiences in terms of sup-
porting tax policy and tax administration reforms which can aect aid-tax relationship
(Benedek et al., 2012; Prichard et al., 2013a). Three strategies are actually employed to
control heterogeneity in aid-tax relationship. The rst one is single country study us-
ing time series. This strategy yields also mixed results. Franco-Rodriguez et al. (1998)
nd a negative relationship between aid and tax eort for Pakistan. Franco-Rodriguez
(2000) and Osei et al. (2005) shows a positive eect of aid on tax in Costa Rica and
Ghana respectively. This approach is limited by the low number of observations and the
diculty to make a comparison among countries which is essential in aid eectiveness
literature. The second and most used strategy is panel data to account for both the
individual and temporal dimensions. The third is PSTR. We proceed with a formal-
ization of the ways heterogeneity is taken into account in the literature, to show the
8
Études et Documents n° 8, CERDI, 2016
advantage of the PSTR approach following Destais et al. (2007).
Let us consider a simple cross-section model of the relationship between aid and
taxation like that used by Brautigam and Knack (2004) and Knack (2009):
taxi =  + aidi +Xi + i (1)
i = 1; :::N . where taxi is the taxation index for the i
th country of the sample of N coun-
tries for the average period studied and aid the aid measure. Xi are control variables,
the other determinants of tax.  and  are constants for the period and i is i:i:d:(0; 
2
 ).
This simple model exhibits that the (long term) impact of aid is the same for all the
countries and given by . This strong assumption can be partially circumvented by
introducing dummy variables and pooling countries by classes. Another drawback of
cross-section model is that the number of observations is limited. Panel data analysis,
by contrast, makes use of larger samples and reduces the problem of multicollinear-
ity among the explanatory variables and the eects of missing or unobserved variables
(Hsiao, 2014).
A simple form of panel specication is:
taxit =  + aidit +Xit + it (2)
where it is i:i:d:(0; 
2
 ); t denotes time period with t = 1; :::T . However, this model
does not still allow for heterogeneity. Heterogeneity of the constant  can be introduced
through country xed eect.
taxit = i + aidit +Xit + it (3)
The individual eects i capture the inuence of country-specic time-invariant
variables like tax system administration capacity or structural characteristics. However,
this allows heterogeneity of the average level of tax only.
These panel specications can then be improved by including dummy variables for
subgroups of countries sharing some specic economic characteristics or institutional
arrangements. Gupta et al. (2003) add a dummy for oil exporters. Benedek et al. (2012)
and Bhushan and Samy (2012) include a full set of time dummies. Brun et al. (2011b)
interact their variable of interest (IMF program) with a dummy for sub-Saharan African
countries.
A more general accounting for heterogeneity is to split the sample into subgroups.
As robustness tests, regressions are then run on these sub-samples to catch whether
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the eects dier from those of the whole of sample and across the sub-samples. The
guiding criteria are either the membership to a specic region, or the countries are
situated above or under a certain cuto of a specic economic or institutional variable
or time period. Gupta et al. (2003) split their sample by quartiles according to ICRG
corruption index. Their results suggest that grants have a stronger negative eect on tax
eort in the most corrupt countries. Adopting the same approach, Benedek et al. (2012)
distinguish the type of aid, and country groups by income and regions. For instance,
the resulting estimations show a negative relationship for total aid and ODA grants
in Africa and Asia and Pacic. Loans have signicant negative eects only in Africa.
Restricting their sample over the period 1985-2005, Clist and Morrissey (2011) take
into account a structural break in the aid-tax relationship, giving grants a statistically
signicant and positive eect. Morrissey et al. (2014) nd evidence that grants have a
positive impact in the cases of Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and Caribbean.
Second, splitting the sample into two sub-samples, 1980-1990 and 1990-2010 they come
to the same conclusion of Clist and Morrissey (2011).
The sub-sample approach with panel data provides more insight on the heterogeneity
in aid eects on tax revenues. Nevertheless, the previous critics against the use of
dummy variables are also valid for the sub-sample technique. It estimates an average
eect of aid for a particular sub-group. Moreover,the choice of the cuto is often
discretionary and arbitrary. It does not allow a country to move from a group to
another. It implies that the distribution of each group is the same relative to the chosen
threshold variable. This strong assumption may result in a meaningless estimate of aid
impact if, for instance, the degree of political commitment in reforms diers across
countries of the same group and over time. In addition, Hansen (1999) shows that the
ad hoc sample splitting may pose serious inference problems.
Another approach to account for the heterogeneous eect of aid is to allow for non-
linearity in the form of increasing or decreasing returns. Determining potential aid
thresholds from which aid eect shifts has important policy implications. Indeed, if
aid has a positive eect on taxation but with decreasing returns above a certain cuto
of aid, then the absorptive capacity of aid is limited. The resulting straight policy
implication is to not exceed this cuto. Adversely, a negative eect with increasing
returns means that countries need a big push in aid to reverse the eect. The opposition
between absorption capacity and big push is at the core of the debate on aid-development
relationship. It is usual to check such nonlinearities by including aid and its square term
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in the regressions as follows:
taxit =  + aidit + aid
2
it +Xit + it (4)
For instance, in Gupta et al. (2003), and in Benedek et al. (2012), the square term
coecient is positive for total aid and grants, but rarely signicant for loans. By
contrast, Clist (2014) nd a positive eect with decreasing returns for all types of aid
(total, grants and loans). Morrissey et al. (2014) nd decreasing returns for grants and
total aid against positive ones for loans. However, both studies nd that the scope
of decreasing returns is modest since the net eect of aid becomes negative only at
exceptional turning points of 69% of GDP (Morrissey et al., 2014) and 65% of GDP
(Clist, 2014).
Moreover, the use of the quadratic specication has a number of caveats, since the
nonlinearity shape is arbitrary and do not allow modeling multiple turning points.
Lastly, the aid-tax literature is inconclusive also because aid could aect both di-
rectly and indirectly tax revenues via several potential factors. As we state above
policies associated with aid may potentially aect tax rates, bases and tax collection.
According to Morrissey et al. (2014), right-hand side variables in tax equation that
aim at proxying tax base like agriculture and industry shares, GDP, imports and ex-
ports cannot adequately account for these policy eects. Morrissey et al. (2014) and
Carter (2013) show how it is hard to make distinction between behavioral, condition-
ality/policy and technical assistance eects. For instance, the liberalization reforms,
supported by aid conditionality, have induced tax reductions but also a growth revival
which may potentially generate tax revenue increase.
The empirical results on these potential channels are mixed. A typical illustration
is that of the level of development, proxied by GDP or GDP per capita. Economic
growth, human capital development and infrastructures are engines of development
and they are likely supported by aid through budget support. However, impacts of aid
on these factors are likely to be nonlinear and heterogeneous across countries (Elbadawi,
1999; Fielding and Gibson, 2013; Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001; Hadjimichael et al., 1995;
Kourtellos et al., 2007; Kalyvitis et al., 2012; Guillaumont and Guillaumont-Jeanneney,
2009). This obviously cannot be captured by the estimate of a single average value of
the aid coecient (Gomanee et al., 2005).
In short, as stated by Carter (2013) simple panel specications cannot capture non-
linearities and heterogeneities in direct and indirect impacts of aid on tax. Thus, while
Carter (2013) uses a Pooled Mean Group (PMG)estimators that allows for hetero-
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geneities in the short run responses and intercepts but imposes a common long run
relationship, we here adopt a more general approach with the PSTR estimator on a
reduced-form model.
3 Data and specication
3.1 Model specication
We use a Panel Smooth Transition Regression (PSTR) specication that was recently
developed by Gonzalez et al. (2005) and Fok et al. (2005). It is a generalization of the
Panel Threshold Regression (PTR hereafter) approach of Hansen (1999) in which the
coecients of a reduced-form model are function of the value of a transition variable.
A number of recent papers have used this approach to examine how the individual
coecients of an interest variable vary smoothly over time according to a threshold
variable. On aid-tax issue, only Yohou et al. (2016) have used PSTR. Considering a
basic case of two regimes and a single transition function, the PSTR model takes the
following form:
taxit = i + 0xit + 1xitg(Ait; ;A) + uit (5)
The vector xit includes the aid variable A and the other traditional factors. 0 and
1 are two vectors of parameters to be estimated. They capture the direct impact of x
on tax and the indirect, conditional on aid, non-linear, impact of x on tax, respectively.
i denotes the xed individual eects while uit the idiosyncratic error and g is the
transition function.
The transition function is a continuous function of the threshold variable given by
the following logistic function (Granger and Terasvirta, 1993; Gonzalez et al., 2005):
g(Ait; ;A) =
241 + exp(  mY
_|=1
(Ait   A _|))
35 1 (6)
where A (A1; : : : ; Am)
0 is an m-dimensional vector of location (threshold) parameters
and the estimated term  measures the slope of the transition function or the sharpness
of the regime shift. The eect of x on tax revenue for country _{ at time t results from
its direct and aid-conditional eects. It is given by:
@taxit
@xit
= 0 + 1g(Ait; ;A); g 2 [0; 1] (7)
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However, the expression of aid eect is slightly dierent from that of the equation
7 since the threshold variable qit is a function of aid. It equals to:
@taxit
@Ait
= 0 + 1g(Ait; ;A) + 1
@g(Ait; ;A)
@Ait
Ait (8)
As equations 7 and 8 show, the size of coecients 0 and 1 cannot be directly
interpreted at the rst stage of the estimation only their respective signs make sense
because there are as many values of each estimates between 0 and 0 + 1 as the
number of country-year observations. However, when the value of the slope  equals
zero, the transition function reduces to a constant. The model becomes a standard
linear model with individual eects, i.e. constant and homogeneous coecients. If 
tends towards innity, the transition function becomes an indicator function and the
PSTR model in (1) reduces to the two-regime PTR model of Hansen (1999) in the case
where m = 1, for instance. When m  1 and  tends to innity, the number of regimes
remains two but the function switches between zero and one (Colletaz et al., 2006).
3.2 Estimation and tests of specication
The estimation procedure consists in eliminating the individual eects i by removing
country-specic means and applying nonlinear least squares to the transformed model.
Gonzalez et al. (2005) propose the following procedure: i) testing the linearity against
the PSTR model (or testing homogeneity against the PSTR alternative), ii) determining
the number, r, of transition functions, that means the number of extreme regimes
which is equal to r + 1. The test of homogeneity in PSTR model can be done by
testing: H0 :  = 0 or H0 : 1 = 0. However under the null hypothesis, the tests
are non-standard since the PSTR model contains unidentied nuisance parameters.
This identication problem is circumvented by replacing g(aidit; ; aid) by its rst-
order Taylor expansion around  = 0 and to test an equivalent hypothesis based on the
auxiliary regression:
taxit = i + 

0xit + 

1xitAit + :::+ 

mxitA
m
it + u
m
it (9)
The linearity test against PSTR is then equivalent to testing Ho : 

1 = ::: = 

m = 0.
The corresponding F-statistic is then dened by:
LMF =
(SSR0   SSR1)=mk
SSR0=(TN  N  mk)  F (mk; TN  N  m(k + 1)) (10)
where SSR0 is the panel sum of squared residuals under H0, and SSR1, the panel
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sum of squared residuals with regimes. k is the number of explanatory variables, T is
the number of years and N the number of countries. The test of homogeneity is also
used to determine sequentially the number of transitions. The null hypothesis that
the model is linear at a predetermined signicance level  is tested. If it is rejected,
a two-regime PSTR model is estimated. If the two-regime at turn is rejected a three-
regime is estimated. The testing procedure continues until the rst acceptance of the
null hypothesis of no remaining heterogeneity. At each step of the sequential procedure,
the signicance level must be reduced by a constant factor 0    1 in order to avoid
excessively large models.
There remains a crucial question about the issue of endogeneity caused by a simul-
taneity or double-causality since low tax level countries may then benet from higher
aid. The use of instrumental variables in aid-tax studies provides contrasting results
according to the instruments used as argued by Clist and Morrissey (2011). We avoid
such sensitivity to instruments by not using any instrumentation for a couple of reasons.
First, Fouquau et al. (2008) and Bereau et al. (2012) argue that a PSTR limits the po-
tential endogeneity issue since there is a specic value of the parameter for each level of
threshold variable. For comparison purpose, they use the generalized method moments
(GMM) estimation with interaction terms and a PSTR corrected for endogeneity and
a "standard" PSTR. They nd that the results derived from the corrected PSTR are
close to those of non corrected PSTR and both are superior to the former. Second and
most importantly, Yu (2013) and Yu and Phillips (2014) demonstrate that in threshold
regressions, both the threshold point and the threshold eect do not need any instru-
mentation in order to be identied. The need for extra randomness in the regressors
is averted by the discontinuity structure of the cuto itself which supplies identifying
information for the parametric coecients. In particular, the former author shows that
2SLS estimators in threshold models with endogeneity are inconsistent. Obviously, it
would be imprudent to generalize this conclusion to PSTR model even if the latter and
the instrumental variable threshold models are close to the pioneer model of Hansen
(1999). Consequently, we lag aid (as suggest Clist and Morrissey (2011)) and all the
variables. The reference paper of Gonzalez et al. (2005) adopts a similar approach.
3.3 Data and the model variables
Most existing studies use either total government revenues or total tax revenues as the
left-hand side variable. However, the real concern of the political economy literature is
how aid does aect the state-citizen-relationship. Then, reliance on non-resource tax
revenues is rather the most appropriate measure (Prichard et al., 2013b). In addition,
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there is no theoretical argument that aid leads a government to cut natural resource
revenues.
We use two tax eort measures from the two advanced competing datasets from the
scal aairs department of International Monetary Fund kindly provided by Benedek
et al. (2012) (IMF henceforth) and from the newly government revenue dataset de-
veloped by Prichard et al. (2014) through the International Center for Taxation and
Development (ICTD henceforth). ICTD dataset builders claim that they have greatly
improved data in terms of coverage and accuracy in comparison with the dataset used
by Benedek et al. (2012) especially. However, the updated IMF tax dataset has also
beneted from critical improvements taking advantage of the updated work of Man-
sour (2014). Moreover, tax data denitions dier between the two datasets. IMF tax
variable is the ratio of total tax revenues excluding social contributions and grants
as percentage of GDP while ICTD tax variable additionally excludes non tax revenues
(mainly composed of resource revenues). To our knowledge, only Morrissey et al. (2014)
make use of non-resource government revenues data.
Regarding the right hand side variables, we follow the standard empirical literature
on aid-tax issue (Gupta, 2007; Gupta et al., 2003; Teera and Hudson, 2004; Morrissey
et al., 2014; Yohou et al., 2016), and we select the most prominent mediating factors.
Hence the set of variables includes the quality of institutions, the level of development,
the sectoral composition of the economy, the trade openness and the resource rent
wealth.
Strong institutions are benecial to tax collection and implementation of tax re-
forms in a sustained eort. Good institutions can create lower and bearable tax rates
while expanding the bases through growth notably, improving the collection eciency.
On the contrary, in a weak institutions country, where the level of corruption is high
for instance, the trust in government may collapse leading to lower incentives to pay
taxes. The noxious eects of rent-seeking on tax performances are well established. Aid
conditionality including some obligations to run specic tax reforms or to improve gov-
ernance may then potentially strengthen the positive eects of the level of institutional
quality on tax capacity. The institutional quality variable is taken from Kuncic (2014)
who has summarized more than 30 institutional quality indexes around three major
components including legal, political and economic institutions. We use the average
of the three sub-indices. We then avoid an arbitrary choice of a specic institutional
quality indicator as Gupta et al. (2003), Benedek et al. (2012) and Brun et al. (2011b)
have done.
GNI per capita is a proxy of the level of development of a country. Higher income
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countries has a more monetized economy and ecient tax administration (Agbeyegbe
et al., 2006). A higher level of development is also positively associated with a higher
relative demand for income elastic public goods and services (Bird et al., 2008) and so
with a higher capacity and compliance to pay taxes. Even if this is always debated, we
assume that aid can promote growth and, given that it supports many administration
tax reforms and assistance, that aid can aect the impact of the national income on
tax.
The sectoral composition of the economy is usually captured by two variables: the
share of value added of industry and/or value added of agriculture in GDP. Given that
the statistical distribution of the industry ratio is mostly inuenced by the distribution
of mining and oil in the African sample, and the high correlation of this ratio with other
control variables, we prefer to use the share of manufacturing excluding mining and oil in
the total value added and the share of agricultural value added in the total value added.
Data are from The United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) of the Department of
Economic and Social Aairs (DESA) (UNDATA henceforth). It is usually assumed that
the agriculture or rural sector is more dicult to tax than the industrial (or urban)
sector. A higher agriculture (industrial) share is then negatively (positively) correlated
with tax. Besides the controversies on absorptive capacity and the eects on private
investment, aid may sustain the domestic eort in expanding those sectors without
creating additional government revenues. Simply, government may substitute aid for
taxes raised from these sectors in order to encourage their development. This is not bad
per se since it may satisfy the nal objective of aid. However it is of concern when it is
a systematic response to lobbies claiming tax exemptions notably when the government
expects a higher support from donors. For these reasons, we assume that larger aid
may hinder the contribution of sectoral composition to tax eort.
Trade openness, measured by the ratio of the sum of imports and exports to GDP,
is expected to be positively related to tax, as trade taxes would be easier to collect than
other taxes.This enhancing eect might somewhat crumble with the liberalization and
scal transition reforms accompanying aid. Agbeyegbe et al. (2006) have provided an
interesting explanation on this issue. Trade liberalization has involved the replacement
of quantitative barriers with import duties which would have generated higher trade
tax revenues depending on the level of duties and impact on imports value. Subsequent
scal transition reforms have reduced import duties and trade tax revenues in favor of
VAT and other domestic taxes. The net eect of aid on tax through liberalization and
reforms, trade openness, tax and customs administration, is then uncertain.
Natural resource wealth is alternatively captured by the ratio of non-tax revenue
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to GDP and the sum of oil and gas rents ratios to GDP. A strand of the resource
curse literature gives a similar role to aid and natural resources. The resource curse
literature suggests that resource windfalls impede democracy and thus deteriorate the
social contract leading to tax collection, lower the incentives to build state capacity for
collecting taxes and providing services (Knack, 2009). One can expect that aid and
technical assistance, and associated tax reforms for instance, may inuence the eect
of natural resources on tax, for a given level of natural resources.
Regarding the aid variable, we select the usual ratio of aid-to-gross national income.
It refers to the total net ocial disbursement ows (net of repayment of principal)
according to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) denition of ocial de-
velopment assistance. Data on aid, GNI per capita, oil-gas rents and trade variables
are from the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank. Constrained
by data availability, our study covers an unbalanced panel of 47 out of the 54 African
countries over the period 1990-2011. 1
Descriptive statistics
Table 6 in appendix reports the main descriptive statistics. The average tax level in
Africa is relatively low in comparison with the other developing countries and OECD
countries. It stands at about 18 % and 13% of GDP for the total tax revenues (Tax-IMF)
and the non-resource tax revenues (Tax-ICTD) respectively. High values of standard
deviations indicate a huge variability in our sample. Meanwhile, aid reliance is high
standing at more than 10% of GNI. As for tax revenues, the standard deviations of aid
variables also indicate important disparities across countries. Aid-tax relationship also
diers greatly at a rst glance. Some countries show low aid reliance and poor non-
resource tax revenues (Algeria, Angola) but high total tax performances. Benin and
Central African Republic have almost the same aid reliance (about 11% of GNI) but
exhibit contrasting total tax performances (about 14% and 8% of GDP respectively).
Figure 1 plots the simple relationship between aid and tax revenue or change in tax
revenue according to the degree of aid reliance for both tax eort measures. Roughly im-
posed here, high (low) aid reliance countries are those where aid-to-GNI ratio is higher
(lower) than the sample average. The gure shows that high reliance is negatively
associated with tax-to-GDP level, but positively with tax-to-GDP growth, signaling
1Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt
Arab Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, The Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia,
Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanza-
nia, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Excluding countries are mostly conict countries:
Djibouti, Eritrea, Liberia, Libya, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia and South Sudan.
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Figure 1: Aid reliance and tax performances over 1990-2011
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the complexity of the relationship. This may suggest that initially aid-reliant coun-
tries are not necessarily the least performing in improving tax collection through time.
Consequently, accounting for time-varying relationship between aid and tax may be a
requisite.
Pairwise correlations from table 7 show that total tax revenue (IMF) is positively
correlated with its usual determinants, except with aid and agriculture. Yet, the non-
resource tax variable (ICTD) is negatively associated with natural resource wealth. Aid
tends to be associated with the other tax determinants, except agriculture import. The
high correlation between some tax determinants signals a potential multicollinearity
bias.
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4 Results
4.1 Tax maximizing overall aid rate
We start with simple PSTR regressions before testing for aid-conditional channels of
the impact of aid on tax. Details of these exploratory results are not reported to save
space and are available on request. First, a simple PSTR regression of tax on aid
only evidences a non-linearity but estimated coecients are insignicant throughout
the regimes, suggesting the need to include additional control variables. Second, we
add control variables (openness, GNI per capita, manufacture, agriculture, institutions,
resources) in a simple way, with no interaction with aid. Results still suggest a very
marginally signicant non-linearity. Third, we gradually enter aid variable and inter-
action between aid and controls. In some cases, we do not nd any non-linearity.
Table 1 then reports the conclusive results of the fourth step, where we add inter-
action between aid and each control, alternatively (maintaining the others as simple
controls), for both ICTD and IMF measures of tax. We here exclude single aid variable
to explore only indirect conditional to aid controlling for the eects of the other tax
factors. Roughly, we nd that increasing aid improves the eect of trade openness and
of GNI per capita on tax, but worsens the eect of resource wealth. Generally, the other
controls have the expected coecient signs. Openness, GNI per capita and institutions
aect positively and signicantly tax eort while agriculture and manufacture eects
are statistically insignicant. As expected, resource wealth increases IMF-total taxes
and lowers ICTD-non-resource taxes.
We now use the general PSTR specication presented above where all right-hand
side variable impacts are conditional on aid thresholds. We used various specications,
log-log, semi-log and so on, to check the sensitivity of our results to specication and/or
outliers. The results are similar to those reported in Tables 2 to 4.
For both tax variables, 5 to 6 specications are proposed to check the robustness of
the results. The rst specication is the most standard specication without resource
wealth as control. Following Trevi~no and Thomas (2013), the second specication in-
cludes resource wealth. The third and fourth specications address Clist and Morrissey
(2011) suggestion to disentangling and replacing trade by import and export openness,
respectively (alternatively to avoid multicollinearity). We do not report estimates for
IMF-tax revenue with exports that have no economic sense. The following specication
excludes the "single" aid variable from regressions to keep sight on potential shifts on
the other determinants eects if the direct aid eect is not accounted for. The last one
deals with the issue of potential collinearity posed by the agriculture variable.
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Table 1: Aid, tax factors and Tax eort: Individual variable conditional eect
Channel Openness GNI per capita Resource revenue
Model Tax-ICTD Tax-IMF Tax-ICTD Tax-IMF Tax-ICTD Tax-IMF
Threshold (ODA=GNI) 0.7303*** 17.2082*** 0.8393*** 13.8132*** 6.9195*** -
Slope parameter () 1605.52*** 95.5630*** 0.4996*** 47.0784*** 3128.3407*** -
0: Channel -0.0438*** 0.0049 0.7636 4.6099*** -0.1636*** -
(0.0154) (0.0084) (0.6564) (0.8043) (0.0306)
1: Channel*g(Ait; ;A) 0.0537*** 0.0111** 1.5695*** 0.4780*** -0.0398* -
(0.0149) (0.0056) (0.3616) (0.1797) (0.02133) -
Control variables:
Openness 0.0077* 0.0156** 0.0089** -
(0.0041) (0.00627) (0.0041) -
GNI per capita (log) 2.3130*** 5.0332*** 2.5847*** -
(0.5422) (0.7886) (0.5554) -
Manufacture -0.0752 -0.0469 -0.0662 -0.0378 -0.0860* -
(0.0475) (0.0679) (0.0475) (0.0680) (0.0477) -
Agriculture 0.0354 0.0205 0.0324 0.0226 0.0361 -
(0.0297) (0.0447) (0.0296) (0.04466) (0.0299) -
Institutions (log) 2.4268*** 2.9304*** 2.3932*** 2.8588*** 2.4865*** -
(0.4471) (0.6551) (0.4459) (0.6550) (0.4490) -
Resource taxes -0.1976*** -0.2212*** -
(0.0250) (0.0255)
Oil and Gas 0.1624*** 0.1582*** -
(0.0251) (0.0250)
AIC criterion 1.8469 2.5484 1.8407 2.5449 1.8572 -
Schwartz criterion 1.8938 2.5962 1.8876 2.5927 1.9041 -
Number of observations 926 905 926 905 926 -
Notes: Independent variables are lagged. * signicant at 10%, **signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%.
Standard deviation in parentheses.
Table 2: Tests for linearity and remaining nonlinearity
Variable Tax-IMF Tax-ICTD
Model 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 6
Number of location parameters 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Wald test
H0: r = 0 versus H1: r = 1 31.861 36.175 35.288 35.317 35.965 84.360 58.538 55.048 62.129 68.008 58.722
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
H1: r = 1 versus H1: r = 2 9.978 11.569 11.615 7.510 9.030 5.128 3.000 3.301 3.744 6.579 2.100
(0.126) (0.116) (0.114) (0.185) (0.172) (0.527) (0.885) (0.856) (0.879) (0.474) ( 0.910)
Fischer test
H0: r = 0 versus H1: r = 1 5.191 5.068 4.939 6.936 5.884 14.561 8.405 7.873 7.828 9.867 9.849
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
H1: r = 1 versus H1: r = 2 1.565 1.550 1.557 1.413 1.413 0.801 0.400 0.440 0.435 0.879 0.327
(0.154) (0.147) (0.145) (0.217) (0.207) (0.569) (0.903) ( 0.877) (0.900) (0.522) (0.923)
LR test
H0: r = 0 versus H1: r = 1 32.420 36.916 35.993 36.023 36.698 88.277 60.393 56.684 64.224 70.528 60.589
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
H1: r = 1 versus H1: r = 2 10.032 11.643 11.690 7.541 9.075 5.142 3.004 3.306 3.752 6.601 2.103
(0.123) (0.113) (0.111) (0.183) (0.169) (0.526) (0.885) (0.855) ( 0.879) (0.472) (0.910)
Notes: p-values in parentheses.
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Table 2 reports the results for linearity and no remaining nonlinearity tests with
one location parameter (m = 1) because the tests of the existence of two thresholds
are rejected.2 Whatever the tax eort measure and the specication considered, the
three tests strongly reject the null hypothesis of linearity at the level of 1% between tax
revenues and aid. It then questions the accuracy of most of the recent aid-tax empirical
ndings that do not show such a relationship, especially for Africa, like those of Bhushan
and Samy (2012), Benedek et al. (2012), Clist (2014) and Clist and Morrissey (2011).
Moreover, tests do not reject the null hypothesis of one transition function against two
for all specications and tax eort variables. They indicate that the nonlinearity or
cross-country heterogeneity and time variability of aid-tax revenues relationship are
properly featured by a small number of extreme regimes.
Figure 2 displays the graphs of the transition functions for both tax revenues from
the equation 5. Except for the IMF-model 2, the relative low values of the slope pa-
rameters show that the transition function is suitably featured by a PSTR structure.
However, results from ICTD-models record the lowest values of the slope parameters
suggesting that aid eects are more gradual for non-resource tax revenues compared to
total tax revenues. From IMF-models, the slope parameter of the transition function
ranks between 1.5 and 2.6 except in the second specication which exhibits the excep-
tional value of 1192.1. From the ICTD models, the lowest and the highest slope values
are 0.20 and 1.49 respectively.
Figure 2: Transition functions
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2Results for m = 2 are available on request.
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Tables 3 and 4 report the estimates of the nal PSTR models for IMF and ICTD
tax variables (IMF-models and ICTD-models), respectively. As noted above, at this
step only the signs of the estimated parameters are interpretable, not their values. For
each specication, 0 measures the direct eect on tax of the corresponding variable
whereas the aid-conditional eect is measured by 1. A positive (negative) value of 1
indicates an increase (a decrease) in the aid or the channel impact with the value of
the threshold variable.
Our results point three major lessons. First, the nonlinearity between aid and tax
collection cannot be reduced to a limited number of regimes with dierent estimates.
Second, they conrm that the approaches consisting in grouping countries, using sub-
samples or modeling the nonlinearity by a quadratic term of aid are unsatisfactory. They
heavily underestimate the pattern of the heterogeneities across countries and over time.
Third, the nonlinearity between aid and tax must account for the transmission channels
through the eect of aid on the relationship between tax and its other determinants.
The estimated threshold stands at about 6.3% of GNI for the total tax revenue
against 23% for non-resource tax revenue. For both tax eort measures, the aid coef-
cient 0 is signicantly positive while 1 is signicantly negative excepted for ICTD-
models 2, 3 and 6. This implies that the positive eect of aid decreases when the ows
of aid increase with respect to the estimated threshold. Interestingly, the turning point
in the aid-non-resource tax relationship is relatively high compared to that of the aid-
total tax relationship (as table 6 shows), suggesting that only a substantial high level
of aid higher than the sample average of the aid-to-GNI ratio can dampen the social
bargaining between state and citizen.
However, irrespective of the tax eort measure, our results do not support the
evidence that the impact of aid on tax shifts at exceptionally high and implausible
levels of aid as found by Clist (2014) and Morrissey et al. (2014).
Regarding the indirect eects, they vary depending on the channel considered and
to some extent on the tax measure. Meanwhile the signs associated with 0 for each
factor are in line with the literature and our preliminary results.
22
Études et Documents n° 8, CERDI, 2016
Table 3: PSTR aid-IMF total taxes (% of GDP) in African countries
IMF1 IMF2 IMF3 IMF4 IMF5
Threshold (ODA/GNI) 7.1857 6.3433 6.317 6.5244 6.3467
Slope 1.7665 1192.1 2.4144 1.5119 2.6448
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
Aid 0.0096** -0.0090* 0.0146*** -0.0140*** 0.0112** -0.0106** 0.0122** -0.0116**
(0.0047) (0.0046) (0.0049) (0.0049) ( 0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0048 (0.0047)
Openness 0.0006*** 0.0004 0.0007*** 0.0006** 0.0008*** 0.0006* 0.0008*** 0.0006*
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) ( 0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003 (0.0003)
Import 0.0009** 0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0004)
GNI per capita (log) 0.2064*** -0.0870*** 0.1774*** -0.0742** 0.1614*** -0.0504 0.1492*** -0.0509 0.1682*** -0.0623*
(0.0309) ( 0.0357) (0.0311) (0.0351) (0.0316) (0.0360) (0.0295) ( 0.0363) (0.0307 (0.0360)
Manufacture -0.0191*** 0.0164*** -0.0185*** 0.0159*** -0.0195*** 0.0170*** -0.0207*** 0.0181*** -0.0195 *** 0.0169***
(0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0037) (0.0035) ( 0.0039) (0.0038) ( 0.0039) ( 0.0039) ( 0.0039 (0.0038)
Agriculture -0.0013 -0.0007 0.0009 0.0001 0.0004 -0.0001
(0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0755) ( 0.0666) (0.0017) (0.0012)
Institutions (log) 0.2121*** 0.0681 0.2171*** 0.0355 0.2530*** 0.0009 0.2674*** -0.0469 0.2337*** 0.0047
(0.0768) (0.0701) (0.0017) (0.0011) (0.0764) (0.0683) (0.0743) ( 0.0627) (0.0758 ( 0.0669)
Oil and Gas 0.0035*** 0.0004 0.0036*** 0.0012 0.0030*** 0.0010 0.0032*** 0.0008
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
AIC -4.687 -4.780 -4.756 -4.776 -4.779
BIC -4.616 -4.700 -4.675 -4.716 -4.708
Observations 905 905 905 905 905
Note: All independent variables are lagged. *, **, *** signicant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Mauritania is excluded because of a critical level of missing data.
The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of total tax revenue to GDP. Standard deviation in parentheses.
Table 4: PSTR aid-ICTD non-resource taxes (% of GDP) in African countries
ICTD1 ICTD2 ICTD3 ICTD4 ICTD5 ICTD6
Threshold (ODA/GNI) 24.6485 23.6777 23.0085 23.4754 26.2719 23.782
Slope 0.2895 0.8452 1.4941 0.9626 0.2066 0.7767
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
Aid 0.0549* -0.0466 0.0491** -0.0405 0.0494** -0.0534** 0.0509** -0.0465* 0.0484** -0.0343
( 0.0294 ) (0.0284) ( 0.0235) (0.0259) (0.0236) (0.0266) ( 0.0236) ( 0.0260) (0.0235) ( 0.0253)
Openness 0.0094** 0.0812*** 0.0114*** 0.0657*** 0.0118*** 0.0622***
(0.0038) (0.0097) ( 0.0035) (0.0075) (0.0035) (0.0074)
Import 0.0130*** 0.0759*** 0.0096** 0.0723*** 0.0055 0.0655***
(0.0032) (0.0086) (0.0041) (0.0097) (0.0044) (0.0112)
Export 0.0174 0.0416 0.0174 0.0815*
(0.0166) ( 0.0273) (0.0174) (0.0441)
GNI per capita (log) 1.8806*** 2.2019 2.8707*** 3.7619*** 2.8653*** 3.4410*** 2.8672*** 3.5630*** 2.3731*** 6.5873*** 2.9659*** 4.4805***
( 0.4630) (1.5872) ( 0.5163) (1.0818) (0.5019) (0.9912) (0.5025) (1.0628) (0.5004) (1.6654) (0.5231) (0.9792)
Manufacture -0.0972 -0.0026 -0.0935 -0.0653 -0.0888 -0.0206 -0.0951 -0.0510 -0.1046* -0.0630 -0.0901 -0.0787
(0.0649) (0.0822) ( 0.0627) (0.0604) (0.0627) (0.0549) (0.0602) (0.0603) (0.0603) (0.0785) (0.0632) (0.0576)
Agriculture -0.0104 0.1253*** -0.0156 0.0402 -0.0213 0.0410* -0.0131 0.0402 -0.0196 0.0060
(0.0212) (0.0432) (0.0209) (0.0262) (0.0210) (0.0247) (0.0220) (0.0257) (0.0228) (0.0428)
Institutions (log) 7.3385*** -9.7585*** 7.1767*** -8.5804*** 7.2763*** -7.6487*** 7.0225*** -8.1543*** 7.5883*** -12.3667*** 7.1376*** -8.6366***
(1.6425) (1.9303) (1.5781) (1.4928) (1.5917) (1.3531) (1.5706) (1.4932) (1.6452) (2.1368) (1.5716) (1.5082)
Resource revenues -0.1454*** -0.2575*** -0.1392*** -0.1063* -0.1510*** -0.2043** -0.1475*** -0.3712*** -0.1449*** -0.3161***
(0.0247) (0.0649) (0.0254) (0.0551) (0.0315) (0.0817) (0.0325) (0.1098) (0.0247) (0.0591)
AIC 1.815 1.776 1.781 1.781 1.779 1.771
BIC 1.885 1.855 1.86 1.87 1.858 1.841
Observations 926 926 926 926 926 926
Note: All independent variables are lagged. *, **, *** signicant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard deviation in parentheses.
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Trade openness has a statistically positive eect on both tax measures at 1 or
5% level. Its aid-conditional eect exhibits a positive and signicant sign across the
specications. Similar results emerge from specications with import openness but not
with export openness that does not show a robust eect. Our results conrm those of
Morrissey et al. (2014) and support the assumption of "aid absorption" mechanism as
argued by Aiyar and Ruthbah (2008) and Carter (2013). Aid causes import directly
when donors and recipients pay for imports and indirectly when the dollars are sold by
the recipient central bank to domestic importers.
Results on agriculture are less robust. While not signicant in the IMF-models, a
signicant positive eect is found in only two ICTD-models. By contrast, manufacture
shows a robust eect with IMF-models. Its eect is negative but higher aid induces a
positive eect. This little evidence of the sectoral eect may result from a combination
of domestic policies that grants a lot of tax exemptions and aid support toward the
private sector. If the former policies tend to inhibit the contribution of the private
sector to tax, the second by encouraging its development allows the private sector to
be compliant with taxes.
We nd that higher GNI per capita enhances signicantly tax performances irre-
spective of the tax measure. However, the aid-conditional eect of GNI per capita is
positive on non-resource tax but negative on total tax. Institutional quality also aects
positively tax revenues. However, there is no evidence of any eect of the institutional
quality in upper aid regimes when considering total tax revenues. By contrast, increase
in aid tends to lower institution eect on non-resource tax. A higher resource wealth
is associated with higher total tax revenues and this eect is not aected with larger
aid ows. Conversely, higher resource wealth harms non-resource tax signicantly and
this negative eect is also signicantly worsened when aid increases in respect with the
estimated threshold. Hence our results indicate that the arguments of Brautigam and
Knack (2004), Knack (2009) and Azam et al. (1999) that larger aid and/or resource
rents are noxious to institutions in promoting taxation hold only when one considers
the non-resource tax revenues. Our results are also in line with the ndings of Trevi~no
and Thomas (2013) that exhibit a negative eect of resource wealth on taxation for
Sub-Saharan Africa.
So far the PSTR helps to highlight the heterogeneous aid eects across countries
and over time according to aid deviation from its estimated threshold. We now turn to
an exploration of country-specic results where the actual impact of aid is determined
by the actual location of the country, given by the actual aid receipts, which can change
over time, relatively to aid threshold.
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4.2 Country-specic elasticities
Figure 3 displays GNI per capita, openness, institutions and resources elasticities of
tax that are functions of the level of aid-to-GNI from IMF-model 5 and ICTD-model 3
using equation 7. Table 5 reports for each country the average over the period of these
estimated elasticities.3
For the entire group and the entire period, the aid-elasticity of tax, given the ob-
served levels of aid, is positive, equaling 0.33 for IMF-total tax and 0.03 for ICTD-
non-resource tax. At least 74% of the countries of our sample has registered a positive
eect of aid on domestic revenue mobilization. This result is in line with some existing
ndings especially Gupta (2007) and Clist (2014) that evidence a small positive eect.
However, 12 and 7 out of the 47 countries exhibit a negative elasticity with IMF-model
and ICTD model respectively.
Figure 3: Factor elasticities of tax
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However these averaged elasticities hide changes over time as Figure 4 illustrates
for 6 countries. The negative aid-elasticities in Tanzania, Rwanda, Guinea-Bissau are
mainly due to the past ineciencies that recent progress can not curb. The aid-elasticity
for Morocco tends to be constant, that for Cabo Verde is positive since 1999 while that
for Sierra Leone is very erratic.
3As we use log of tax revenue for IMF-models, the coecients of the independent variables have been
multiplied by 100, except GNI per capita and institution which are already in log to ease comparison
between the size of the coecients. For ICTD-models, the coecients GNI per capita and institution
have been divided by 100.
25
Études et Documents n° 8, CERDI, 2016
Figure 4: Time-varying country-specic aid-elasticities of ICTD-non-resource tax, se-
lected countries
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Similar analysis with the other factor-elasticities of tax are derived from equation 7.
Except institutions and resource wealth in IMF-model which exhibit homogenous elas-
ticity across countries when 1 statistically equals 0, Table 5 highlights heterogeneous
eects. On average, an increase of 1% of GNI per capita is associated with a 0.13% or
a 0.03% increase in tax in IMF and ICTD-model respectively.
A 1-point higher quality of institutions is associated with a 0.23 point and 0.07
point increase in tax in IMF-total tax and ICTD-non-resource tax respectively. While
resource wealth-elasticity of IMF-total tax is homogenous and positive across countries,
the resource-wealth-elasticity of ICTD-non-resource tax is heterogeneous, depends on
aid levels compared to thresholds, but is negative for every countries, with a sample
average of -0.15 (a 1% increase in resource-wealth lowers non-resource tax by 0.15%).
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Table 5: Country-specic average factor-elasticities of tax over 1990-2011
Aid Openness GNI pc Institutions Resource wealth
Country IMF ICTD IMF ICTD IMF ICTD IMF ICTD IMF ICTD
Algeria 1.2200 0.0494 0.0800 0.0130 0.1682 0.0287 0.2337 0.0728 0.3200 -0.1392
Angola 0.3069 0.0273 0.1000 0.0147 0.1474 0.0294 0.2337 0.0710 0.3200 -0.1416
Benin 0.0100 0.0494 0.1399 0.0130 0.1060 0.0287 0.2337 0.0728 0.3200 -0.1392
Botswana 1.0234 0.0494 0.0822 0.0130 0.1659 0.0287 0.2337 0.0728 0.3200 -0.1392
Burkina Faso -0.0775 0.0236 0.1395 0.0149 0.1064 0.0295 0.2337 0.0709 0.3200 -0.1418
Burundi -0.0640 -0.0474 0.1378 0.0596 0.1082 0.0498 0.2337 0.0258 0.3200 -0.2044
Cabo verde 0.0600 0.0193 0.1400 0.0304 0.1059 0.0365 0.2337 0.0552 0.3200 -0.1636
Cameroon 0.1856 0.0494 0.0937 0.0130 0.1540 0.0287 0.2337 0.0728 0.3200 -0.1392
Central African Republic -0.2556 0.0483 0.1346 0.0131 0.1115 0.0287 0.2337 0.0727 0.3200 -0.1393
Chad -0.5582 0.0492 0.1305 0.0130 0.1158 0.0287 0.2337 0.0728 0.3200 -0.1392
Comoros -0.1868 0.0425 0.1375 0.0165 0.1085 0.0302 0.2337 0.0692 0.3200 -0.1441
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.5121 0.0276 0.1105 0.0176 0.1366 0.0307 0.2337 0.0681 0.3200 -0.1457
Congo, Rep. 0.4674 0.0282 0.1055 0.0226 0.1417 0.0330 0.2337 0.0631 0.3200 -0.1527
Cote d'Ivoire 0.2122 0.0451 0.1076 0.0132 0.1395 0.0287 0.2337 0.0726 0.3200 -0.1395
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.9684 0.0494 0.0885 0.0130 0.1594 0.0287 0.2337 0.0728 0.3200 -0.1392
Equatorial Guinea 0.6587 0.0255 0.0998 0.0307 0.1476 0.0367 0.2337 0.0549 0.3200 -0.1640
Ethiopia -0.1606 0.0490 0.1390 0.0130 0.1070 0.0287 0.2337 0.0727 0.3200 -0.1392
Gabon 1.2044 0.0494 0.0801 0.0130 0.1681 0.0287 0.2337 0.0728 0.3200 -0.1392
Gambia, The -0.0738 0.0470 0.1262 0.0165 0.1202 0.0302 0.2337 0.0693 0.3200 -0.1440
Ghana -0.2058 0.0494 0.1256 0.0130 0.1208 0.0287 0.2337 0.0728 0.3200 -0.1392
Guinea -0.3444 0.0494 0.1263 0.0130 0.1201 0.0287 0.2337 0.0728 0.3200 -0.1392
Guinea-Bissau 0.0600 -0.0019 0.1400 0.0521 0.1059 0.0464 0.2337 0.0334 0.3200 -0.1939
Kenya 0.5758 0.0494 0.0997 0.0130 0.1477 0.0287 0.2337 0.0728 0.3200 -0.1392
Lesotho -0.2010 0.0494 0.1151 0.0130 0.1318 0.0287 0.2337 0.0728 0.3200 -0.1392
Madagascar 0.0954 0.0330 0.1322 0.0194 0.1140 0.0315 0.2337 0.0664 0.3200 -0.1481
Malawi 0.0600 -0.0557 0.1400 0.0505 0.1059 0.0457 0.2337 0.0349 0.3200 -0.1918
Mali 0.0600 0.0268 0.1400 0.0173 0.1059 0.0306 0.2337 0.0684 0.3200 -0.1452
Mauritania 0.0092 0.0241 0.0337 0.0616 -0.1548
Mauritius 1.2198 0.0494 0.0800 0.0130 0.1682 0.0287 0.2337 0.0728 0.3200 -0.1392
Morocco 1.0802 0.0494 0.0805 0.0130 0.1677 0.0287 0.2337 0.0728 0.3200 -0.1392
Mozambique 0.0600 -0.0865 0.1400 0.0627 0.1059 0.0512 0.2337 0.0227 0.3200 -0.2088
Namibia 0.8069 0.0494 0.0832 0.0130 0.1649 0.0287 0.2337 0.0728 0.3200 -0.1392
Niger 0.0575 0.0317 0.1400 0.0163 0.1059 0.0302 0.2337 0.0694 0.3200 -0.1439
Nigeria 0.8926 0.0494 0.0845 0.0130 0.1635 0.0287 0.2337 0.0728 0.3200 -0.1392
Rwanda 0.0600 -0.0105 0.1400 0.0280 0.1059 0.0355 0.2337 0.0576 0.3200 -0.1603
Senegal -0.2932 0.0494 0.1388 0.0130 0.1072 0.0287 0.2337 0.0728 0.3200 -0.1392
Seychelles 0.6605 0.0494 0.0876 0.0130 0.1603 0.0287 0.2337 0.0728 0.3200 -0.1392
Sierra Leone 0.0600 0.0010 0.1400 0.0449 0.1059 0.0431 0.2337 0.0407 0.3200 -0.1838
South Africa 1.2200 0.0494 0.0800 0.0130 0.1682 0.0287 0.2337 0.0728 0.3200 -0.1392
Sudan 0.5363 0.0494 0.0921 0.0130 0.1556 0.0287 0.2337 0.0728 0.3200 -0.1392
Swaziland 1.2063 0.0494 0.0801 0.0130 0.1681 0.0287 0.2337 0.0728 0.3200 -0.1392
Tanzania 0.0599 -0.0097 0.1400 0.0235 0.1059 0.0334 0.2337 0.0622 0.3200 -0.1539
Togo 0.4104 0.0494 0.1157 0.0130 0.1311 0.0287 0.2337 0.0728 0.3200 -0.1392
Tunisia 1.2198 0.0494 0.0800 0.0130 0.1682 0.0287 0.2337 0.0728 0.3200 -0.1392
Uganda 0.0598 0.0443 0.1400 0.0165 0.1059 0.0302 0.2337 0.0692 0.3200 -0.1441
Zambia -0.1818 -0.0295 0.1360 0.0345 0.1100 0.0384 0.2337 0.0510 0.3200 -0.1694
Zimbabwe 0.3491 0.0494 0.1066 0.0130 0.1406 0.0287 0.2337 0.0728 0.3200 -0.1392
Mean 0.3269 0.0303 0.1147 0.0202 0.1322 0.0319 0.2337 0.0655 0.3200 -0.1494
Notes: The elasticities are calculated according to the formula of the equation 7, except for aid (equation 8) and results from
IMF-model 5 and ICTD-model 3 regressions. Elasticities of institutions and resource wealth with IMF are invariant since
the associated 1 are insignicant.
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In sum, in African countries, the levels of aid are such that they do not hinder direct
eects of aid and transmission channels eects to tax, except in the case of resource
wealth to non-resource tax. We do not report here our preliminary results based on the
grants-loans decomposition of aid as this is not the primary focus of this paper, but
they do not alter signicantly our main conclusions and are available on request.
5 Conclusion
We examine the eects of foreign aid on tax performances for 47 African countries
over 1990-2011 using two tax revenue measures: total tax revenue from IMF and non-
resource tax revenues from ICTD. As originally discussed, the ICTD non-resource tax
measure would better portray the State-citizens contract and then the State bargaining
trade-o between tax and aid.
We assume that the eects of aid on tax vary across countries and over time and
that they depend on aid levels. We also explore the impact of aid on the eects of other
usual determinants on tax.
Using Panel Smooth Threshold Regressions, our results show a huge heterogeneity in
aid eects across African countries and over time. Aid has an enhancing eect but with
diminishing returns when its level becomes increasingly high relative to the estimated
threshold of aid. The estimated turning points are 6.3% and 23% for total taxes and
non-resource taxes respectively. Computing the country-specic aid-elasticities of tax,
we nd that, on average and in the majority of African countries, aid has a positive
eect on domestic tax mobilization. We however nd more reasonable results in line
with the theoretical expectations with ICTD-non-resource tax variable, suggesting that
the choice of the tax measure is quite important. For instance, larger aid beyond specic
thresholds strengthens the positive eect of the level of development and trade openness
(including import) and induces a positive eect of agriculture although marginally.
Meanwhile, larger aid is reducing the institutions and worsening the resource curse
eects on tax. However, the estimated thresholds are high compared to the actual
ows so that aid has not substantially shifted the rst impact (in the rst regime) of
each factor.
In short, our results indicate that the negative eect found in the literature is
overestimated and does not match with the case of African countries when one strongly
accounts for country and time-varying heterogeneities as well as transmission channel.
Providing also the best interpretation of the relationship of interest is also helpful to
suggest appropriate policy recommendations.
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A Appendix
Table 6: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N Source
Tax IMF(% of GDP) 18.164 9.664 3.6 61.5 978 IMF
Tax ICTD(% of GDP) 13.207 7.808 0.6 62.829 1033 ICTD
Non-tax revenue(% of GDP) 6.057 8.588 0 50.096 1032 ICTD
Aid(% of GNI) 10.819 10.751 -0.253 94.946 1030 WDI
Openness (% of GDP) 74.69 47.952 10.748 531.737 1021 WDI
Import(% of GDP) 42.704 32.701 7.066 424.817 1021 WDI
Export(% of GDP) 31.986 20.587 3.188 124.393 1021 WDI
Real GNI per capita 1335.942 2027.638 93.3 17266.491 1033 WDI
Manufacture(% of total value added) 10.918 6.718 0.097 41.12 1034 UNDATA
Agriculture(% of total value added) 24.604 14.441 1.379 56.795 1034 UNDATA
Institutions (Average) 41.3 13 8.5 83.3 1015 Kuncic (2014)
Oil-Gas Rents (% of GDP) 6.441 15.173 0 84.657 1007 WDI
Table 7: Cross-correlation table
Variables Tax IMF Tax ICTD Non-tax Aid Openness Import Export GNI pc Manuf Agri Institutions Oil-Gas
Tax IMF 1.000
Tax ICTD 0.533*** 1.000
Non-tax 0.652*** -0.145*** 1.000
Aid -0.404*** -0.226*** -0.320*** 1.000
Openness 0.513*** 0.304*** 0.390*** -0.168*** 1.000
Import 0.366*** 0.335*** 0.203*** -0.016 0.939*** 1.000
Export 0.612*** 0.176*** 0.587*** -0.366*** 0.838*** 0.599*** 1.000
GNI pc 0.495*** 0.273*** 0.424*** -0.389*** 0.341*** 0.181*** 0.506*** 1.000
Manuf -0.012 0.385*** -0.347*** -0.140*** 0.017 -0.005 0.048 0.010 1.000
Agri -0.703*** -0.426*** -0.515*** 0.486*** -0.5019*** -0.328*** -0.648*** -0.595*** -0.208*** 1.000
Institutions 0.183*** 0.393*** -0.066** -0.157*** 0.008 -0.032 0.069** 0.281*** 0.135*** -0.306*** 1.000
Oil-Gas 0.486*** -0.293*** 0.791*** -0.241*** 0.326*** 0.125*** 0.538*** 0.237*** -0.326*** -0.382*** -0.257*** 1.000
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